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INTRODUCTION 
The European Union (EU) is the world's largest economic and trading area. The EU's unique 
asset and distinct comparative advantage on the global scene is its Single Market, which 
encompasses over half a billion consumers and more than 20 million firms. 
Since its inception, the on-going process of improving and expanding the Single Market has 
gone hand in hand with the development of EU competition policy. The first seminal antitrust 
cases targeting impediments to trade in the Single Market date back to the 1960s, notably the 
pioneering decision in 1964 against Grundig-Consten. That case concerned an agreement to 
partition the market, which had resulted in substantial price differences between France and 
Germany. The Court of Justice upheld the Grundig-Consten decision and reiterated its 
position on private impediments to cross-border trade and competition in subsequent 
judgments1. The adoption of the merger control regulation in 1989 represented a qualitative 
leap in EU competition policy reflecting the development of the internal market after the entry 
into force of the Single European Act in 1987. EU competition policy took into account the 
new market realities of increased opportunities for European firms to merge and acquire 
assets across national borders. Likewise, State aid control has also gradually become an 
essential pillar of the Single Market, ensuring that companies are able to compete on equal 
terms independently of where they are located and providing safeguards against Member 
States engaging in mutual subsidy races at the expense of each other and of the general 
European interest. Finally, the adoption of Regulation 1/2003 ten years ago marked a new era 
in the enforcement of the EU antitrust rules, in which national competition authorities (NCAs) 
have become very active players. The enforcement of the EU antitrust rules is now carried out 
by a multiplicity of enforcers in the Single Market according to the same standard of 
assessment. That regime has significantly enhanced the level of enforcement of the EU 
antitrust rules and underpins the level playing field for companies operating cross-border in 
Europe. 
Without an effective EU competition policy, the Single Market cannot reach its full potential. 
There would be nothing to prevent private barriers to trade and competition from replacing 
the public barriers that free movement rules have dismantled over more than half a century. 
Nor would Member States be prevented from distorting trade and competition through a 
myriad of subsidies, a scenario which naturally favours the fiscally stronger. Weakening EU 
competition policy would undermine the Single Market to the detriment of the growth 
potential of the EU, the individual economies of which – in particular in the eurozone – are 
increasingly interdependent. At the same time, competition policy is also crucial in allowing 
the EU to crack down on abuses of dominant position, cartels and concerted practices that 
harm consumers. 
In 2012 the European Commission continued to ensure the sound functioning of the Single 
Market, despite occasional calls for a softer stance towards anticompetitive conduct by firms 
or Member States in view of the economic crisis.  
No time to relax the enforcement of competition rules  
The decade-long world-wide cartels for colour display tubes and for colour picture tubes, which exhibited all the 
worst kinds of anticompetitive behaviour in the Single Market, is a case in point. Colour display tubes and colour 
                                                            
1 Joined Cases C-56/64 and C-58/64 Grundig-Consten [1966] ECR 299, Judgment of 13 July 1966. See also 
Judgment of 4 October 2011 in Joined Cases C‑403/08 and C‑429/08 Football Association Premier League and 
Others, judgment of 4 October 2011 
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picture tubes are key components that go into the making of television and computer screens, accounting for 50 
to 70% of the price. On 5 December 2012, the European Commission fined seven international groups of 
companies a total of EUR 1 470 515 000 for the two cartels.  
Throughout 2012, all the tools of the EU competition policy – antitrust and merger 
enforcement as well as State aid control – continued to be deployed as levers across 
significant parts of the Single Market. The year 2012 also marked the 20th anniversary of the 
relaunch in 1992 of the European Single Market. This Report on competition policy thus 
focuses on the role of competition policy in leveraging the Single Market for growth. In 2012, 
the Commission also continued working with national competition authorities (NCAs) to 
ensure a coherent application of the EU antitrust rules. In particular, the Commission engaged 
in close cooperation with the national competition authorities within the European 
Competition Network (ECN), including efforts to foster convergence of national procedures 
for the enforcement of the EU antitrust rules which are not generally regulated by EU law. 
This past year EU competition enforcement focused in particular on sectors of systemic and 
cross-cutting importance to the EU economy: financial services; key network industries such 
as energy, telecoms and postal services; as well as knowledge-intensive markets such as 
smartphones, e-books and pharmaceuticals. In those sectors, EU competition enforcement 
(which mainly operates ex post) complements Single Market regulation. 
Many of the issues addressed in this Report were already examined in the course of the 
Commission's continuous structured dialogue with the European Parliament throughout the 
year (see section 5 on Competition Dialogue with Other Institutions and, for further detail, the 
Commission Staff Working Document (SWD) accompanying this Report).  
1. COMPETITION POLICY SUPPORTING A FAIRER AND MORE 
TRANSPARENT FINANCIAL SECTOR  
A viable, transparent and competitive banking system providing finance to the real economy 
is a necessary precondition to restore sustainable growth. The current financial and economic 
crisis has its origins in the financial sector and any exit strategy necessarily requires 
addressing the root causes of the crisis. With that in mind, in 2012 the European Commission 
continued to apply the State aid rules to control the parts of the EU banking sector concerned. 
The bulk of the activity involved the restructuring of banks, so that no more taxpayer funding 
will be needed for the foreseeable future. In cases where banks were beyond restructuring, 
State aid control continued to be used as a de facto resolution mechanism in anticipation of 
more comprehensive Single Market legislation2. Merger and antitrust rules were also 
employed to ensure that the Single Market is underpinned by a transparent and competitive 
financial sector3.  
The temporary emergency regime as a tool for bank restructuring and de facto resolution  
At the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009, State aid control became – more by 
default than by design - the principal tool at EU level to tackle the unprecedented situation. 
The Commission promptly put in place a special State aid regime to control government bail-
                                                            
2 The Commission will come forward with a proposal for a single resolution mechanism for banks. The 
December 2012 European Council agreed that this proposal "would be to be examined by the co-legislators as a 
matter of priority with the intention of adopting it during the current parliamentary cycle" 
3 Responding to European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee calls for action in favour of fair, 
well-regulated and transparent financial markets  
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outs of distressed banks to safeguard the stability of the wider financial system.4 The special 
regime was also designed to ensure the sound functioning of the Single Market. The 
existential threat to the Single Market was evident from the sheer scale of government 
intervention. Between 1 October 2008 and the end of 2011, approximately EUR 1.6 trillion 
were transferred to banks. The amount pledged by EU governments was in fact three times 
greater. The bulk of that amount took the form of government guarantees of banks' liabilities 
and other forms of liquidity support, accounting for over 9% of EU GDP, while 
recapitalisations and impaired-asset support totalled over 3% of EU GDP. The special 
temporary regime continued to ensure that the banks concerned were supported on the same 
conditions across the Single Market. Under these temporary rules, which remain in force as 
long as market and economic conditions require, EU banks in distress can receive government 
support on the condition that they restructure.  
Repairing the financial sector to support the real economy while protecting taxpayers  
The restructuring of individual banks continued to be guided by the imperative of ensuring 
viable business models that support the real economy. Decisions involving cost-cutting, 
divestments and focusing on core activities were taken in relation to inter alia some of the 
German Landesbanken (NordLB and BayernLB), the Spanish banks CAM and UNNIM and the 
Latvian mortgage bank.5 Particular care was taken to ensure that taxpayer money is used to 
return banks to long-term viability and that in the medium term the taxpayers will be paid 
back without losses; indeed, some aid beneficiaries have already started to repay the support 
they received to their governments6. 
As part of the economic adjustment programmes for Ireland, Portugal and Greece, State aid 
control continued to contribute significantly to the restructuring7 of those countries´ entire 
banking sectors as part of a wider effort involving not only the Commission but also the ECB 
and in most cases the IMF. Again, a key concern was to ensure the integrity of the Single 
Market in a context of massive public financial support.  
Restructuring the Spanish banking sector 
In July 2012 the Eurogroup agreed to a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on a sector programme for the 
Spanish financial sector. Under the MoU, a rigorous stress test was carried out covering a three-year period 
through 2014. The stress test identified a capital shortfall of around EUR 60 billion in ten banks. Two of those 
banks, Banco Popular and Ibercaja, raised the necessary capital on the market or through management actions. 
The eight remaining banks that could not meet the shortfall through private resources were recapitalised with 
programme funds and are being restructured or resolved in line with the State aid rules. A first group involved 
banks already controlled by the Spanish authorities: BFA/Bankia, Catalunya Caixa, Nova Caixa Galicia and 
Banco de Valencia. The restructuring plans for those banks were approved on 28 November 2012. For a second 
group, including Banco Mare Nostrum, Banco CEISS, Caja3 and Liberbank, restructuring decisions were 
adopted on 20 December 2012. As a result, the whole Spanish financial system was fully capitalised by the end 
of 2012. The restructuring plans for those banks aim to restore their viability and capacity to provide credit to the 
real economy, while minimising the cost to taxpayers and limiting to the minimum distortions of competition. Of 
the EUR 57 billion capital need for the eight remaining banks, EUR 37 billion will come from the EU 
programme for the Spanish financial sector. As regards to the remaining EUR 18 billion, EUR 12 billion is in the 
form of burden-sharing by junior debt holders, EUR 5 billion from asset disposals by the banks and EUR 
                                                            
4 In essence the special rules mean that the normal rules for aid for rescue and restructuring do not apply to the 
financial sector (see IP/11/1488) 
5 For a comprehensive picture, see Annex 2 to the Staff Working Document accompanying this report 
6 See, among others cases, SA.28487 (see press release IP/12/847) 
7 As well as resolution when needed, as in the case of the Agricultural Bank of Greece 
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1 billion is in the form of the transfer of real estate loans to SAREB, the bad bank set up by the Spanish 
authorities. 
Competition policy accompanies EU Single Market legislation aimed at increasing the 
transparency, fairness and soundness of financial markets  
An ambitious Single Market regulation package is being put in place to make financial 
markets more transparent to address the roots of the financial crisis in areas such as 
derivatives. EU competition policy naturally supports that legislative effort. Transparency is 
essential for competitive markets.  
In 2012, the Commission continued to investigate a number of antitrust cases relating to the 
Libor, Euribor and Tibor benchmark rates. A number of banks and brokers are subject to the 
investigation. The importance of financial derivative products linked to these benchmarks 
cannot be overstated. According to the bank for International Settlements (BIS) the 
outstanding gross market value of the interest rate derivatives in all currencies was USD 19 
trillion in June 2012.8 Those products play a key role in the management of risk in the Single 
Market. The Commission's antitrust investigations were launched before the Libor scandal 
which was triggered by the revelations of manipulation of the Libor/Tibor and later on the 
Euribor benchmark rates, which also gave rise to criminal investigations and investigations 
under financial regulation across many jurisdictions. In July 2012 the Commission amended a 
previous legislative proposal so as to cover the sort of manipulation that is emerging from the 
Libor scandal, making it a criminal offence.  
The Commission also pursued two antitrust investigations in the credit default swaps (CDS) 
market which were opened in 2011. The Commission has continued to analyse, in particular, 
the cooperation between a number of leading investment banks and an information service 
provider. The purpose of the investigation is to establish whether those players acted to 
preserve their stronghold in the profitable Over-The-Counter (OTC) CDS market by hindering 
the development of exchange traded CDS derivatives in a way which may have infringed EU 
competition law. 
The concerted attempts by the Commission and the EU legislature to increase transparency in 
financial markets through Single Market legislation can be subverted by anticompetitive 
collusion and abuses. EU competition policy can be, and is, deployed as part of a wider mix 
of remedies9.  
The Commission also used in 2012 its merger control tools to ensure competitive prices for 
companies which manage their risks by investing in derivatives in the EU. On 1 February 
2012, the Commission prohibited the proposed merger between Deutsche Börse and New 
York Stock Exchange Euronext. The Commission came to the conclusion that the merger 
would eliminate competition and lead to a quasi-monopoly in some derivatives markets, in 
particular the worldwide markets for European single stock and equity index derivatives and 
European interest rate derivatives. In those areas, the two exchanges were de facto the only 
credible global players. The Commission took the view that the merger was likely to lead to 
higher prices and less innovation for derivatives customers and that the remedies proposed by 
the parties were insufficient to address these concerns. 
                                                            
8 Bank for International Settlements, November 2012, available at http://www.bis.org/statistics/derstats.htm, 
figures available at http://www.bis.org/statistics/otcder/dt21a21b.pdf 
9 As called for by the European Parliament 
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Facilitating transactions across the Single Market through better functioning payment 
systems 
In 2012, the Commission pursued its antitrust enforcement action against anticompetitive 
behaviour relating to the multilateral interchange fees (MIFs) charged by credit card 
companies, in particular Visa's and MasterCard. MIFs make up a significant part of the total 
cost that retailers must pay for accepting payment cards. In 2010, 35 billion card payments 
were made in the European Economic Area (EEA), totalling EUR 1.8 trillion. 
Visa's credit and debit cards represent approximately 41% of all payment cards issued in the 
EEA. Over five million merchants accept Visa's payment cards. In 2012, the Commission sent 
a supplementary statement of objections to Visa relating to the MIFs it charges for 
transactions with consumer credit cards in the EEA10. The Commission reached the 
preliminary conclusion that these MIFs reduce price competition between acquiring banks, 
inflate the cost of credit card acceptance for merchants and ultimately increase consumer 
prices. The Commission also found that the obligation on cross-border acquirers to pay MIFs 
applicable in the country of transaction hindered cross-border acquiring and maintained the 
segmentation of the Single Market into national markets, preventing merchants from 
benefiting from lower MIFs in other Member States.  
The Commission's analysis in the Visa case closely followed the judgment of the EU General 
Court in May in the MasterCard case, which fully upheld the Commission's findings on the 
anticompetitive nature of MIFs11. 
2. STATE AID REFORM TO FURTHER DEVELOP THE SINGLE MARKET AND 
SUPPORT GROWTH IN A CONTEXT OF SCARCE PUBLIC RESOURCES 
The past year saw the first decisions applying the new framework on State aid for Services of 
General Economic Interest (SGEIs) adopted in 2011. In May 2012, the Commission launched 
an even more ambitious reform agenda: State Aid Modernisation.  
Entry into force of new rules on SGEIs: extracting the maximum from scarce public budgets 
in support of the European social and economic model 
SGEIs are public services that would not be provided by market forces alone or at least not in 
a form that would be available to all. SGEIs are an integral part of the European social market 
economy model.  
The new SGEI rules (effective as of 31 January 2012) assist public authorities in designing 
smarter, more efficient and more effective services in areas such as energy, transport, 
telecommunications and postal services. The new approach means that the Commission will 
focus on SGEIs that receive large government funds and, therefore, are more liable to distort 
competition in the Single Market. The first decisions (e.g. Post Office Limited)12 illustrate 
                                                            
10 Following the opening of proceedings in March 2008, the Commission sent Visa a statement of objections in 
April 2009 concerning multilateral interchange fees ("MIFs") for consumer debit and credit card transactions 
(see MEMO/09/151). Visa Europe offered commitments to cap its debit card MIFs at 0.20%, which the 
Commission made binding in December 2010 (see IP/10/1684). The proceedings regarding consumer credit 
MIFs continue 
11 Case T-111/08, judgment of 24 May 2012, not yet published 
12 Case COMP/SA.33054 Post Office Limited: Compensation for net costs incurred to keep a non-commercially 
viable network for the period 2012-15 and the continuation of a working capital facility (see IP/12/320). The 
case was assessed under Article 106 TFEU 
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how the State aid rules can guarantee continued delivery of postal and other essential public 
services while ensuring fair competition in the Single Market13 (see also section 3.3 below). 
State Aid Modernisation: Tackling the twin challenges of growth and budgetary constraints 
while safeguarding the Single Market 
On 8 May 2012 the Commission launched the State Aid Modernisation (SAM), a reform of 
the whole of State aid policy. Prioritising enforcement on cases with a significant impact on 
the Single Market is one of the keys objectives of the SAM. Another key objective is to 
ensure that scarce public budgets are targeted at real market failures, i.e. that they are not 
wasted on projects that would have been carried out in any case. In other words, SAM's aim is 
to facilitate the treatment of aid which is well-designed, targeted at identified market failures 
and objectives of common interest, and least distortive. Aid which does not provide real 
incentives for companies crowds out private investment and keeps inefficient and non-viable 
companies on life support ("bad aid")14. Good aid strengthens the Single Market while bad aid 
weakens it. State aid is a horizontal tool which extends its scope across the Single Market, not 
least the recently liberalised network industries. Thus, it can and must be designed and 
leveraged so as to help Member States re-launch growth while ensuring fiscal sustainability.  
The process of translating SAM into reality began through revisions of a number of key State 
aid guidelines and frameworks. The objective is to bring them all in line with a coherent 
overall philosophy and methodology. To this end, the Commission launched public 
consultations on the current rules on State aid to broadband infrastructure, environmental 
protection and regional development. Work also progressed on reviews launched earlier on 
aid for research, development and innovation, risk capital and rescue and restructuring. The 
intention is for the bulk of the SAM related rules to be in place by the end of the term of the 
current European Parliament15.  
3. PROMOTING COMPETITION IN NETWORK INDUSTRIES: THE BACKBONE 
OF THE SINGLE MARKET 
3.1 Integrating energy markets in support of sustainability  
Removing the remaining obstacles in gas and electricity markets requires Single Market 
legislation supported by competition policy  
In 2005, the Commission carried out an in-depth sector inquiry into gas and electricity 
markets which revealed that - despite efforts to integrate the Single Market since the late 
1990s through EU sectoral regulation - serious obstacles to competition remained, in 
particular concentrated markets with high entry barriers, often dominated by vertically 
integrated incumbents. The problems were compounded by limited interconnection capacities 
between Member States. That state of affairs had led to divergent prices and conditions of 
supply throughout the Single Market. The Commission followed up its inquiry through 
                                                            
13 Responding to calls from EP and ECOSOC 
14 Speech of Vice-President Almunia on 8 October 2012 (see SPEECH/12/701) at the European Parliament 
Presenting the Competition Policy Work Programme for 2013/14. Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-12-701_en.htm 
15 Idem 
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antitrust enforcement often using decisions accepting commitments offered by dominant gas 
and electricity players in several countries16. 
EU competition policy cannot on its own integrate the EU gas and electricity markets, ensure 
competitive prices and security of supply. A third legislative package on gas and electricity 
was therefore adopted in 2011 and is currently in the process of implementation with a view 
to creating an EU-wide Single Energy Market by 2014. 
Shifting the focus of antitrust enforcement in the energy sector eastwards 
Most antitrust investigations and decisions in this area, since the publication of the sector 
inquiry into gas and electricity in 2005, have focused on western European markets. Recently, 
and in particular during 2012, the emphasis has shifted eastwards. Central and eastern 
European gas networks tend to be less interconnected across borders than western European 
networks.  
In the CEZ case, concerning an alleged abuse of a dominant position by the Czech electricity 
incumbent, the Commission market-tested in 2012 structural commitments aimed at 
remedying foreclosure of the Czech electricity market. In Bulgaria, the Commission is 
investigating potential foreclosure by the national company BEH gas, as well as obstacles to 
cross-border trade in electricity. In addition, on 11 December 2012 the Commission opened 
formal antitrust proceedings against OPCOM, which allows producers and buyers to trade 
electricity in Romania, and its parent company Transelectrica, a state-owned enterprise which 
controls the power grid in that Member State. The Commission has concerns that OPCOM 
may be abusing its dominant position by discriminating against companies on the basis of 
their nationality or place of establishment. Power exchanges are crucial for the transparent 
and reliable formation of electricity prices.  
In 2012, the Commission also opened antitrust proceedings against Gazprom in relation to its 
alleged conduct in a number of central and eastern European gas markets. The opening of the 
proceedings was due to the Commission's concerns that Gazprom may have and may be 
abusing its dominant position in upstream gas supply markets in central and eastern Europe, 
in some of which Gazprom is virtually the sole supplier. The proceedings focus on whether 
Gazprom has divided gas markets by preventing the free flow of gas between EU countries 
and whether it is imposing conditions relating to the use of infrastructure that prevent the 
diversification of sources of gas supply. The scope of the proceedings also covers the possible 
imposition of unfair prices on customers. 
Taking account of energy-intensive firms in the context of the EU Emissions Trading System  
Protecting energy-intensive industry against carbon leakage while safeguarding the integrity of the Single 
Market  
The Commission also adopted important State aid rules related to electricity markets. The reform of the EU 
Emissions Trading System (ETS) agreed in 2009 which takes effect from 2013 onwards means that electricity 
production will no longer receive free allowances to emit CO2, which could lead to higher electricity bills for 
                                                            
16 For example, as a result of the Commission's antitrust investigation, Germany’s E.On committed to sell its 
electricity generation assets and its high-voltage transmission grid business in 2008, a milestone in opening up 
the market in Germany. Other investigations have helped lift restrictions on cross-border trading of gas and 
electricity. For instance, the Commission's investigation resulted in changes to the Swedish electricity 
transmission system that was hindering exports by limiting interconnection capacity with neighbouring countries 
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companies in the EU. The rules adopted allow Member States to compensate installations in the most electricity-
intensive sectors for part of any higher electricity costs resulting from the ETS, as from 2013.17 The rules were 
shaped so as to minimise competition distortions in the Single Market in the form of subsidy races at a time of 
economic uncertainty and need for budgetary discipline; for example, by not allowing full compensation for 
higher electricity prices and by reducing the compensation over time. At the same time they were designed to 
preserve the EU objective of decarbonising the European economy. The sectors eligible for compensation 
include producers of aluminium, copper, fertilisers, steel, paper, cotton, chemicals and some plastics. The new 
aid regime enables Member States to prevent production shifts from the EU to third countries with less 
environmental regulation, which could undermine the objective of a global reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions.  
3.2 Accompanying Single Market legislation in telecoms 
Over the past 15 years, EU Single Market legislation has made great strides in injecting 
competition into telecoms markets. Today, incumbents no longer hold monopolies and must 
provide wholesale services and network access to alternative operators. However, many ex-
monopolists still maintain strong market positions by virtue of their ownership of the fixed 
networks they rolled out during the monopoly era.  
Moreover, as regards mobile networks, four out of five EU citizens possess mobile 
subscriptions with one of four major groups. At the same time, many features of the telecoms 
markets remain predominantly national such as licensing of operators and the spectrum for 
mobile services. We are still far from realising the EU Single Market for telecoms; instead we 
are confronted with many operators active in 27 separate markets. Furthermore, there are still 
persistent barriers that limit consumers' ability to take full advantage of market liberalisation. 
A recent study on Internet service provision18 shows that the lack of transparent and 
comparable information as well as contractual barriers (such as long contract duration and 
charges for early contract termination) discourage consumers from switching. 
Tackling market power and fragmentation in telecoms markets in parallel with Single Market 
legislation  
Against that background, ex post EU competition law enforcement is required to accompany 
Single Market ex ante regulation, in particular to ensure equal access conditions for new 
entrants.  
In 2012, the Union Courts upheld19 a 2007 Commission decision fining Telefónica for an 
abuse of its dominant position in the Spanish broadband market. The prices that Telefónica 
charged its wholesale clients – which were at the same time competitors at the retail level - 
forced them to make losses if they wanted to continue to operate on the market. 
The Commission pursued an antitrust case relating to potential anticompetitive conduct by 
Slovak Telekom on several wholesale broadband markets in Slovakia and investigated whether 
its parent company Deutsche Telekom may be held liable for Slovak Telekom's conduct.  
The Commission also pursued an antitrust case against Telefónica and Portugal Telecom 
concerning their agreement not to compete with each other on the Iberian telecommunications 
                                                            
17 The rules allow subsidies of up to 85% of the increase faced by the most efficient companies in each sector 
from 2013 to 2015, a cap that will gradually fall to 75% in 2019-2020 
18 The functioning of the market for internet access and provision from a consumer perspective in the European 
Union. Study on behalf of the European Commission, Directorate General for Health and Consumers (expected 
to be published in April 2013) 
19 Case T-336/07, judgment of 29 March 2012, not yet published 
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markets. This is the first antitrust case in the telecoms sector which concerns a cross-border 
market sharing agreement. It is of particular importance for the Commission to investigate 
this issue in order to avoid that the Single Market is artificially compartmentalised along 
national borders.  
The Commission also examined the manner in which five large telecom operators (the "E5": 
Deutsche Telecom, France Télécom, Telefónica, Vodafone and Telecom Italia) as well as the 
mobile sector association GSMA developed standards for future mobile communications 
services. The Commission's action was meant to ensure that the standardisation process was 
not being used to foreclose competitors. 
Under the EU Merger Regulation, the European Commission unconditionally approved the 
creation of a joint venture between Vodafone, Telefónica and Everything Everywhere in the 
field of mobile commerce in the United Kingdom. Mobile commerce or "mobile wallets" is a 
nascent fast-moving sector. The Commission's central concern was to ensure that these types 
of markets remain open so that a number of competing solutions can emerge without undue 
obstacles. The investigation revealed that a number of alternatives already existed and many 
more were very likely to emerge in the near future to ensure adequate competitive pressure on 
the UK joint venture's mobile wallet platform.  
In December 2012, the Commission also approved the acquisition by Hutchison 3G Austria of 
its competitor Orange, the reducing the number of operators from to three. The approval was 
subject to a number of conditions. Hutchinson committed to making spectrum available, a 
necessary condition for the entry of new mobile network operators. Hutchinson also 
committed to make wholesale access available to up to 16 virtual operators without a full 
network of their own. Before the implementation of the merger the parties had to conclude an 
agreement with the upfront entrant.  
Supporting the roll-out of broadband infrastructure across the Single Market  
The roll-out of new infrastructure for broadband networks across the Single Market was another strategic focus 
of EU competition policy in 2012. Here the main challenge was that while commercial operators are shouldering 
most of the investment, they have little incentive to extend the reach of their networks into remote, sparsely 
populated and rural areas where the market alone will not bear their costs. At the same time the Digital Agenda – 
one of the Europe 2020 Strategy Flagship Initiatives – aims to bring basic broadband to all Europeans by 2013 
and seeks to ensure that, by 2020, (i) all Europeans have access to much higher internet speeds (above 30 Mbps) 
and (ii) 50% or more of European households subscribe to very fast internet connections (above 100) Mbps. It is 
clear that government subsidies are required in some instances to address the market failures; indeed, over the 
past two years the Commission approved aid of about EUR 4 billion, verifying inter alia that public funds do not 
crowd out private investment.  
During the year – as part of the comprehensive State Aid Modernisation project - the Commission completed its 
update of the rules on State aid for broadband infrastructure, i.e. the Broadband Guidelines, to bring them further 
in line with the ambitious Digital Agenda objectives of promoting very fast broadband connections throughout 
the EU. To this end, the new Guidelines aim to achieve the right mix between public and private investment 
while building a pro-competitive environment (e.g. by ensuring open access to all operators in the Single Market 
to State funded infrastructure). National incumbents still dominate broadband markets, except in the few 
countries where a nationwide cable infrastructure has been put in place. To help achieve the Digital Agenda 
objective of delivering very fast connections (of more than 100 Mbps) to half of European households by 2020, 
the revised guidelines will allow public funding also in urban areas but subject to very strict conditions to ensure 
a pro-competitive outcome. 
The European Commission also adopted a proposal to amend the Enabling Regulation of 1998. This would allow 
the Commission to exempt certain categories of aid for broadband infrastructure from prior notification to the 
Commission and simplify the approval of certain type of projects. This concerns notably: 
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•             aid covering basic broadband in regions where there is no broadband infrastructure and where no such 
infrastructure is likely to be developed in the near future (‘white’ areas), and small individual aid measures 
covering very high-speed next-generation access (‘NGA’) networks in ‘white NGA’ areas; 
•             aid for broadband-related civil engineering works and passive broadband. 
3.3 Promoting efficient cross-border postal services while ensuring public service  
Postal services are another classic network industry crucial to the functioning of the Single 
Market. Many European firms rely increasingly on just in-time deliveries to keep inventory 
costs at an optimal level. They often use parcel express delivery services as part of their 
logistic chains, notably for cross-border shipments. From a growth perspective, it is essential 
that cross-border postal deliveries operate as efficiently as possible. Efficient postal services 
are also a tool to tap the growing potential of cross-border e-commerce. 
At the same time, the postal sector constitutes a fundamental service of general economic 
interest (SGEI) which may need State aid in situations where the market by itself would not 
guarantee universal and affordable services. EU competition and Single Market rules 
reconcile those two imperatives.  
Phasing in the new rules ensuring the viability of SGEIs and fair competition across the 
Single Market 
Indeed, the first application of the new framework for State aid for SGEIs which came into 
effect on 31 January 2012 concerned the postal sector. In March 2012, the Commission 
adopted two decisions concerning UK Post Office Limited based on the new SGEI 
framework. The Commission found that the aid did not exceed the net cost of the public 
service mission entrusted to the Post Office Ltd and that its entrustment complied with public 
procurement rules. Moreover, the entrustment letter and funding agreement governing the 
payment of the compensation contained appropriate provisions to incentivise an efficient 
provision of the public service, in line with the Post Office Ltd's strategic plan for the period 
2012-2015 which aims at modernising and improving the provision of services over its 
network according to yearly efficiency milestones. 
Similarly, the Commission approved a tax relief measure of EUR 764 million granted by 
France to La Poste, the French incumbent, to enable it to cover costs related to maintaining a 
high density of postal services from 2008 to 2012. It also authorised compensation of EUR 
1.2 billion for the costs incurred by La Poste in carrying out its task of transporting and 
delivering the press over that same period of time. The two aid measures were found to be 
compatible with EU State aid rules as they only partially offset the net costs of the important 
public service tasks incumbent on La Poste and thus did not give it any unfair competitive 
advantage in the Single Market. 
The postal sector deserved particular scrutiny given that the sector was fully liberalised across 
the EU by the end of 2012. To that end, the Commission adopted four major decisions on 
State aid granted by Germany, Belgium, France and Greece to their respective incumbent 
postal operators. For Germany and Belgium, the Commission ordered the recovery of 
substantial amounts of incompatible aid, whereas it approved the French and Greek support. 
Deutsche Post and the Belgian Post had received an amount of aid that exceeded the level of 
compensation required for the provision of the SGEIs that public authorities had entrusted 
them with. For that reason the Commission decided that that extra aid was incompatible with 
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the Single Market since it gave those two companies an advantage over their competitors in 
commercial activities beyond their public service mandate. 
Merger scrutiny to ensure continued competition in cross-border parcel markets 
Developments in the postal sector were also subject to merger scrutiny. The proposed merger 
involving the takeover by UPS of TNT would have reduced the number of companies that 
control pan-European express parcel-transport networks from four to three. On 20 July 2012, 
the Commission opened an in-depth investigation into the planned merger and finally 
prohibited the proposed acquisition on 30 January 2013. The transaction would have restricted 
competition in fifteen Member States in the express delivery of small packages to other 
European countries. In those Member States, the acquisition would have reduced the number 
of significant players to only three or two, sometimes leaving DHL as the only alternative to 
UPS. The concentration would therefore have likely harmed customers by causing price 
increases and by removing the competitive constraint exercised by TNT. The Commission 
carried out an in-depth assessment of the proposed remedies including a market test where 
customers and other interested parties were consulted. However, those remedies proved 
inadequate to remove the identified competition concerns. 
4. HELPING TO UNLOCK THE POTENTIAL OF THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY  
4.1 Preventing misuses in nascent and fast-moving digital sectors  
In digital industries, network effects and lock-in can create entrenched market positions which 
could be used to exclude competitors or new entrants. The Commission has previously taken 
decisions in high-tech sectors, preventing dominant companies from abusing proprietary 
technologies or engaging in other forms of anticompetitive behaviour20. A central challenge in 
digital economy cases is that the markets in question usually move at great speed, 
necessitating timely and effective intervention21. As stated by the ECJ in its Telia Sonera 
ruling: "the […] application of [competition rules] cannot depend on whether the market 
concerned has already reached a certain level of maturity. Particularly in a rapidly growing 
market, Article 102 TFEU requires action as quickly as possible, to prevent the formation and 
consolidation in that market of a competitive structure distorted by the abusive strategy of an 
undertaking […]”22. 
Enabling continued innovation in digital sectors from smartphones to music  
Potential misuse of standard-essential patents in the so-called patent wars among smartphone 
manufacturers were a particular focus during the year. The Commission considered the issue 
of standard essential patents under the EU merger regulation in its approval of the acquisition 
of Motorola by Google23. It also opened three proceedings24 concerning possible abuses by 
Samsung and Motorola of their standard essential patents, partly in order to provide more 
                                                            
20 Notably the Article 102 TFEU cases involving Microsoft (see Commission Decision 
of 24 March 2004 in Case COMP/C-3/Case COMP/C-3/37.792) and Intel (see Commission Decision  
of 13 May 2009 in Case COMP/C-3/37.990) 
21 See speech by Joaquin Almunia Vice President of the European Commission of 8 October 2012 
(SPEECH/12/701) 
22 C-52/09 TeliaSonera Sverige  [2011] ECR I-527 
23 Case COMP/M.6381, Google/Motorola Mobility (see IP/12/129) 
24 Initiation of proceedings against Samsung on 30 January 2012 (Case COMP/C-3/39.939); initiation of 
proceedings against Motorola on 2 April 2012 (Cases COMP/C-3/39.985  and COMP/C-3/39.986) 
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clarity in this field where the Commission received numerous complaints during the year. In 
On 21 December 2012, in respect of one of those three proceedings, the Commission sent a 
statement of objections to Samsung, informing it of the Commission’s preliminary view that 
Samsung's seeking of injunctions against Apple in various Member States on the basis of its 
mobile phone standard-essential patents amounts to an abuse of a dominant position25. 
The critical importance of standard-essential patents to innovation in the ICT sector 
Standard-essential patents are relevant for innovation across entire sectors. Such patents are, by definition, part 
of a standard and the holders of those patents have committed to licensing them on fair, reasonable and non-
discriminatory (FRAND) terms. A possible worst-case scenario is when a company willing to take a licence for 
standard-essential patents on FRAND terms is locked out of the market through court injunctions. Such litigation 
or threats thereof may thus hold up innovation in the entire industry. Standards can be enormously beneficial for 
a number of interconnected markets, fostering interoperability and enabling economies of scale and scope in the 
Single Market and beyond.  
On the merger front, the Commission approved the takeover by Universal - the world´s 
leading record company - of EMI´s recorded music arm after having verified that the 
concentration would not produce negative effects for digital customers and the development 
of new digital services. This is one of several sectors being transformed through digitisation. 
The Commission had concerns that the transaction, as initially notified, would have allowed 
Universal to significantly worsen the licensing terms it offered to digital platforms that sell 
music to consumers. To meet those concerns, Universal offered substantial commitments 
(essentially consisting of the divestiture of a significant portion of EMI's repertoire in the 
EEA, including top-selling active and catalogue artists, as well as of a commitment by 
Universal not to include so-called "Most Favourite Nation" clauses in its licensing agreements 
with digital music services in the EEA for a period of ten years). In light of these 
commitments, the Commission concluded that the transaction did not raise further 
competition concerns. 
Commitment decisions as a flexible alternative to ensure the rapid restoration of competition 
in fast-moving digital markets 
Commitment decisions such as the one used in the e-books case (see below) can obviate the 
need for lengthy proceedings and enable the Commission to obtain concrete results for 
consumers. However, such an approach only works if the commitments entered into are 
scrupulously complied with. If not, the Commission has the power to impose fines.  
On 12 December 2012, the Commission adopted a commitment decision in the e-books 
sector, another nascent and fast-moving part of the digital economy, that rendered legally 
binding commitments offered by Apple and four international e-book publishers: Simon & 
Schuster (CBS Corp.), Harper Collins (News Corp.), Hachette Livre (Lagardère Publishing) 
and Verlagsgruppe Georg von Holtzbrinck (owner of inter alia Macmillan). 
The Commission had opened proceedings in December 2011 against these companies, as 
well as a fifth international e-book publisher, Penguin (Pearson Group). While the December 
2012 decision was not addressed to Penguin as that publisher chose not to offer commitments 
to the Commission, the Commission is currently engaged in constructive discussions with 
                                                            
25 See press release at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-1448_en.htm 
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Penguin on commitments that would allow an early closure of proceedings also against that 
publisher.  
In its decision, the Commission expressed concerns that Apple and the four international e-
book publishers may have colluded to limit retail price competition for e-books in the 
European Economic Area (EEA), in breach of EU antitrust rules. Prior to January 2010, e-
books were sold by publishers to retailers mainly under the so-called "wholesale model", 
whereby retailers would buy e-books from publishers and then freely determine the retail 
prices for those e-books when sold to consumers. In January 2010, Apple and the four 
international e-book publishers jointly switched to agency contracts that all contained the 
same key terms, with the result that retailers became sales agents for publishers who wanted 
to sell directly to consumers. Under this "agency model", the four publishers determined the 
retail prices for e-books according to pricing rules in the agency contracts. Those pricing rules 
were designed in a way that resulted in higher retail prices than those offered by certain major 
retailers at the time. In some countries in the EEA, they were designed in such a way as to 
exclude any possibility of lower prices being offered to consumers in the first place. 
In order to address the Commission's concerns, Apple and the four international e-book 
publishers agreed to terminate all their existing agency agreements that included the retail 
price restrictions and the pricing rules the Commission had objected to. Apple and the four 
international e-book publishers also committed, for a period of five years, not to enter into any 
new agreements containing the pricing rules the Commission had objected to. The four 
international e-book publishers further agreed, for a period of two years, to allow retailers to 
offer retail price discounts for e-books up to an amount equal to the commission the retailer 
receives from the publisher over a one year period. 
The commitments ended the practices that were at the origin of the Commission's concerns 
and restored conditions that will allow the e-books market to reset itself. Where permitted by 
national retail price laws for e-books, this has the potential to result in lower e-book prices for 
consumers in the EEA. 
A case involving an alleged abuse of a dominant position concerns Google. The Commission 
has expressed concerns that four types of Google business practices may constitute an abuse 
of a dominant position within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU, namely: (i) the way in which 
Google’s vertical search services are displayed within general search results as compared to 
services of competitors; (ii) the way Google may use and display third party content on its 
vertical search services; (iii) exclusivity agreements for the delivery of Google search 
advertisements on other websites; and (iv) restrictions in the portability of AdWords 
advertising campaigns. Google submitted a detailed commitment text at the end of January 
2013. The Commission's services are currently analysing Google's proposal with a view to 
deciding whether it would allow the Commission to start the process for the adoption of a 
decision pursuant to Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003. 
Non-compliance with a previous commitment decision was at issue in a case concerning 
Microsoft. In December 2009, the Commission made legally binding on Microsoft 
commitments offered to address competition concerns related to the tying of Microsoft's web 
browser, Internet Explorer, to its dominant client PC operating system Windows. Specifically, 
Microsoft committed to make available for five years (i.e. until 2014) in the European 
Economic Area a "Choice Screen" enabling users of the Windows operating system to choose 
in an informed and unbiased manner which web browser(s) they wanted to install in addition 
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to, or instead of, Microsoft's web browser. The choice screen was to be provided as of March 
2010 to European Windows users who have Internet Explorer set as their default web 
browser.  
However, in a decision adopted on 6 March 2013, the Commission found that Microsoft had 
failed to roll out the browser choice screen with its Windows 7 Service Pack 1 from May 
2011 until July 2012, with the result that 15 million Windows users in the EU did not see the 
choice screen during this period. Microsoft has publically acknowledged that the choice 
screen was not displayed during that time.  
4.2 Preventing misuses of IPRs in the pharmaceutical sector  
Pharmaceuticals are another sector where knowledge, inventions and ideas and the intellectual 
property rights (IPRs) they embody are of central importance. However, in that sector, patent 
holders  and generic companies may be tempted to enter into anticompetitive agreements 
delaying the entry of cheaper generic medicines, especially when the basic patent protection 
around the active substance nears expiry or after expiry. At the same time, many such patent 
settlements may be a rational and socially beneficial way to reduce uncertainty and avoid 
litigation costs.  
Against this background, the Commission launched an inquiry into the pharmaceutical sector 
in 2008, the results of which were published in July 200926. During 2012, the follow-up to the 
inquiry advanced on several fronts. In terms of antitrust enforcement, on 25 July and 30 July 
2012 the Commission sent statements of objections to more than fourteen companies in two 
major cases involving possible anticompetitive agreements and unilateral practices.  
Statements of objections in respect of conduct potentially delaying the entry of generic antidepressants 
and cardiovascular medicines in the Single Market  
One of the statements of objections concerned the Citalopram case where the originator company Lundbeck and 
several generic competitors entered into agreements which may have hindered the entry of generic citalopram 
into markets in the EEA. Citalopram is the active substance of a class of antidepressants. The statement of 
objections was also addressed to Merck KGaA, Generics UK, Arrow, Resolution Chemicals, Xellia 
Pharmaceuticals, Alpharma, A.L. Industrier and Ranbaxy, all of which belonged to the generic groups that 
concluded the agreements. The sending of a statement of objections does not prejudge the final outcome of the 
investigation. 
The companies concluded these agreements when generic entry in principle became possible due to the expiry of 
certain of Lundbeck's citalopram patents. According to the preliminary findings in the statement of objections 
the agreements foresaw substantial value transfers from Lundbeck to four generic competitors. In turn, the 
generic companies abstained from entering the Single Market to sell generic citalopram. Lundbeck's value 
transfers to the generic competitors included, among other things, direct payments purchases of generic 
citalopram stock for destruction as well as guaranteed profits in distribution agreements offered to the generic 
firms. The Commission took the preliminary view that this conduct, if proven, may have caused substantial 
consumer harm, since generic entry could have been delayed and prices kept higher as a result of the agreements.  
The second statement of objections concerned the Perindopril case where Les Laboratoires Servier and several 
generic competitors entered into agreements which may have hindered the entry of generic perindopril in the 
Single Market. Perindopril is the active substance in a class of cardiovascular medicines. According to the 
preliminary view set out in the statement of objections, in exchange for payments by Servier, the generic 
companies agreed not to enter the market with their cheaper generic products and/or not to further challenge the 
validity of the patents that protected Servier's more expensive medicine. Similarly, Servier may have 
implemented a comprehensive strategy to prevent market entry of cheaper generic versions of perindopril at the 
time when the patent protection for Servier's perindopril was nearing expiry. The practices under analysis 
                                                            
26 See IP/09/1098 and MEMO/09/321 
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include acquisitions of patents that could potentially exclude competitors from the market as well as patent 
settlements with other companies that included the type of reverse payments at issue in the Citalopram case. 
The practices at issue in the Citalopram and Perindopril cases could, if the allegations were to be proven, involve 
significant harm as national health services and insurance schemes would be forced to continue paying longer for 
the more expensive patent protected versions of a medicine. 
Sanctioning such anticompetitive practices is necessary to preserve incentives to innovate in this sector. 
Anticompetitive conduct should not be used to artificially prolong patent protection which by definition is 
limited in time. That limitation is essential to preserve incentives for continuous innovation in knowledge-
intensive sectors such as pharmaceuticals. 
The Commission continued to monitor potentially harmful patent settlement agreements 
between originators and generic firms  
In July 2012, the Commission issued its third monitoring report on patent settlements in the 
pharmaceutical sector27. The report confirmed that, while the overall number of concluded 
settlements significantly increased, the proportion of settlements that may be problematic for 
competition fell by half as compared to the levels observed at the time of the sector inquiry. 
The proportion of potentially problematic settlements stabilised at 11% compared to the 21% 
identified by the sector inquiry. At the same time, the total annual number of concluded 
settlements increased by 500% to 120 compared to the findings of the sector inquiry. Most 
settlements appear to be unproblematic from an antitrust perspective. The figures show that 
the Commission's scrutiny has not hindered companies from concluding settlements in the 
Single Market, contrary to some initial fears expressed by certain stakeholders. 
In its judgment in the AstraZeneca case the Court of Justice ruled that EU competition law 
complements Single Market rules 
In June 2005, the Commission adopted a decision sanctioning AstraZeneca (AZ) for two 
infringements of Article 102 TFEU and Article 54 of the European Economic Area (EEA) 
Agreement. The decision found that AZ had misused public procedures and regulations in a 
number of EEA states aimed at excluding generic firms and parallel traders from competing 
against AZ’s bestselling antiulcer product Losec.  
In a judgment of 6 December 2012 (Case C-457/10 P) the Court of Justice upheld the General 
Court´s judgment of 2010 which had, to a very large extent, dismissed AstraZeneca´s appeal 
against the 2005 Commission decision, the first decision imposing fines for an abuse of a 
dominant position in the pharmaceutical sector. In particular, the General Court had 
confirmed that misuses of regulatory procedures can under certain circumstances constitute 
abuses of a dominant position.  
The Court of Justice found that in a majority of cases abuses of dominant positions consist of 
behaviour which is otherwise lawful under branches of law other than competition law. This 
confirms that EU competition policy is complementary, and not subordinate, to other 
branches of EU law, including Single Market rules. 
5. COMPETITION DIALOGUE WITH THE OTHER INSTITUTIONS 
5.1 Structured dialogue with the European Parliament 
                                                            
27 See MEMO/12/593 
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DG Competition engages in a continuous structured dialogue on competition issues with the 
European Parliament, and its Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) Committee in 
particular. 
Structured dialogue with the ECON Committee 
As part of the structured dialogue, the Vice President in charge of Competition visited ECON twice in 2012. In 
June, he presented the Annual Report on Competition Policy and in October, the Commission Work Programme 
for 2013. The Vice President also maintains regular contacts with the European Parliament outside the structured 
dialogue. On 22 May 2012, he attended a workshop on the European Competition Report on the food sector28. 
On 24 September 2012, he participated in a hearing on LIBOR-EURIBOR market manipulation. The Vice 
President also attended a workshop on State aid modernisation (25 September 2012) and an event on data 
protection and competition rules (26 November 2012).  
In the context of the cooperation, on 7 June 2012 DG Competition organised a seminar for 
assistants and political advisers of the members of the ECON covering the main themes in the 
2011 Competition Work Programme29. The Vice President exchanged views with the IMCO 
committee on 28 February 2012 on competition and growth. DG Competition regularly 
informs the relevant committees of public consultations and the adoption of new guidelines. 
All in all, the Vice President made eight appearances before the European Parliament (see 
table). 
 
Public consultations and Impact assessments 
DG Competition provides information on the launch of public consultations to the secretariat of the ECON  and 
more generally welcomes timely contributions by the members of the EP. Its services are available to brief 
MEPs on aspects of particular interest. Public consultations and the responses thereto, studies related to 
competition policy, studies which are commissioned, Impact Assessments in the area of competition policy as 
well as any related Staff Working Papers are published on DG Competition's website30. 
In response to the interest expressed by the members of the ECON committee in the 
Commission's State aid modernisation communication, the Vice President and DG 
                                                            
28 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/food_report_en.pdf  
29 Issues covered included State aid in the financial sector the food sector, the aviation sector, the financial sector 
and the State aid modernisation initiative 
30 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/index_en.html  
Date Meeting Issue 
28/02/2012 EP IMCO committee Exchange of views on competition and growth 
22/05/2012 EP ECON Competition Working 
Group  
ECN report and CAP reform 
19/06/2012  EP ECON structured dialogue  Presentation of Annual Competition Report 
2011 
11/09/2012 EP Plenary Question Time State of play of the energy market acquis (3rd 
package) implementation - Gazprom 
24/09/2012 EP ECON Public Hearing - Libor Market manipulation - Libor 
25/09/2012 EP ECON Workshop – SAM State aid modernisation 
08/10/2012  EP ECON structured dialogue Presentation of work programme for 2013 
26/11/2012 EP Event – Privacy Platform Competition and Privacy in Markets of Data 
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Competition officials attended a State aid modernisation workshop in Parliament on 8 
October 2012. 
As part of the discussion on the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy, MEPs called on 
the Commission to have a closer look at the issue of producers' bargaining power vis-à-vis 
retailers in the food supply chain. While the Commission did not identify particular 
competition problems in the retail sector, as expressed in the report published by the European 
Competition Network31, it nonetheless launched a study to assess the impact of retail market 
structure on product innovation and choice in the food sector in December 2012. 
MEPs frequently ask the Commission questions on individual on-going competition cases. 
The Commission is unable to reply on certain aspects of those cases due to the confidentiality 
requirement of the investigative procedures.  
On-going investigations and sector inquiries 
DG Competition staff regularly meet MEPs at their request to explain the procedural steps in an investigation 
and to engage in a general discussion on a particular sector, as far as possible under the confidentiality obligation 
in relation to the parties. DG Competition has a range of tools at its disposal for the enforcement of EU 
competition law and making markets more competitive by other means, such as investigations in individual 
cases, sector inquiries and working with other Directorates General on regulatory measures impacting 
competition in the Single Market.  
5.2 Follow-up to Parliament's Resolution on the 2010 Report on Competition Policy 
In January 2012, the Parliament adopted its Resolution on the 2010 Report on Competition 
Policy32, making a series of requests to the Commission. In addition to the official response 
by the Commission to Parliament's Resolution, the Commissioner for Competition responded 
in April 2012 through a letter to the Chair of the ECON committee, and DG Competition also 
submitted a detailed response to all of the points made in the Parliaments Resolution. 
Topics covered by the European Parliament's Resolution 
The Parliament was particularly interested in the DG Competition's activities linked to the financial and 
economic crisis and the role of State aid control in that context. In its response, the Commission stressed the 
types of conditions routinely imposed as part of the application of the temporary State aid rules applying to the 
banking sector for the time being. That so-called conditionality includes burden sharing and restructuring 
imposed on banks and financial institutions to ensure that their viability is restored on a long-term basis while 
preserving the integrity of the Single Market.  
In its Resolution, the Parliament also recalled its earlier requests33 for the Commission to bring forward 
legislation to facilitate effective compensation for damages resulting from breaches of antitrust law. The 
Commission's Work Programme for 2012 includes a proposal on antitrust private damages actions. The Vice 
President in charge of Competition confirmed that such a proposal will be tabled in 2013. In response to the 
Parliament's call to investigate competition in the food sector, DG COMP set up an internal task force on the 
food sector which coordinated a European Competition Network study on the food sector. In addition, in 
December 2012 the Commission launched a study on modern retail sector impact on food product choice and 
innovation. 
5.3 Competition DG Competition's engagement with the EESC and the CoR  
The Commission also informs the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) and the 
Committee of the Regions (CoR) about major policy initiatives. It also participates in study 
                                                            
31 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/food_report_en.pdf  
32 P7_TA(2012)0031 
33 Resolutions by the European Parliament in 2007, 2009, 2010 and 2011 
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group and section meetings. On 4 September 2012, Vice President Almunia met the EESC 
rapporteur on the State Aid Modernisation initiative and, on 7 December 2012, the CoR 
rapporteur on the revision of the Regional aid guidelines. On 14 November 2012, the EESC 
adopted an opinion on the State aid modernisation initiative34 and, on 4 December 2012, the 
INT section of the EESC adopted an opinion on the Annual Competition Report 201135. On 
29 November 2012, the CoR adopted an opinion on the State Aid mModernisation initiative36 
and, on 7 December 2012, the COTER commission of CoR adopted an opinion on the 
Regional aid guidelines37. 
                                                            
34 Available at http://www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.int-opinions.23584 
35 Available at http://www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.int-opinions.24209 
36 Available at http://www.toad.cor.europa.eu/corwipdetail.aspx?folderpath=ECOS-V/035&id=21619 
37 Available at http://www.toad.cor.europa.eu/corwipdetail.aspx?folderpath=COTER-V/034&id=21792 
